[[Elise Springer]]

Alternative Account

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 05:01:20 GMT

!Instead of a [[verdict model]] with its focus on discerning moral ''properties'', I believe more promise lies in understanding the sort of competence that could be described as [[critical virtue]], whose exercise requires ambivalence and dialogue. Principles and theory emerge as important ''interventions'' and mark the tentative resting-points of critical dialogue, rather than serving as ultimate foundations of judgment. In this light, moral theory is a form of moral practice, and our attention should shift from static models of justification to situated practices of critical engagement. \n!How to represent what we encounter (including how to represent what others say) is, on this view, an immediate and pervasive ''practical question''. Alas, ingredients that if combined would add up to truth do not necessarily mix well together in hard cases. A broadly ''pragmatist account'' of [[Representation]] helps show how the best critical representations in one circumstance may be inappropriate in others. Nevertheless, the skills and sensitivities involved in [[critical virtue]] are difficult achievements open to careful exploration.\n

verdict model

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 05:01:10 GMT

It is not common for a verdict-oriented model to be clearly articulated by proponents; it tends to pass as common sense that what a moral critic is doing is expressing moral judgments which aim to be true assessments of the ''moral status'' or properties of an action (or an agent). Such judgment is to be derived from basic moral principles, whether deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-theory-based. \n!Though some verdict theorists advocate "particularist" attention to details about the act in question, they do not allow that the circumstances of a //critic's// utterance is relevant to moral judgment. The [[critical virtue]] approach is thus a more radical challenge to standard accounts of judgment.

Research Project

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 05:00:49 GMT

My research, starting with the [[Dissertation]] project, focuses on the relationship between moral ideals and the ''activity of criticism''. A //Moral Theory and Constructive Criticism// text is in process, with [[Chapters]] in various stages of completion.\n!The impetus for this work begins with a question: In cases of [[moral provocation]] -- being troubled by someone's deeds or by conflict -- how does a responsible moral agent proceed? A [[verdict model]] of criticism requires that we ''reach judgment'' on each act under scrutiny: it must be assessed on its merits, by principle or by consequences. Supposing we can reach such justified moral verdicts, is it clear what role these play in responsible moral criticism? It seems the problems of deciding upon an appropriate reaction are as complex as the initial problem, and not much resolved by any intermediate step of judgment. Thus, I seek an [[alternative account]].\n!Additional research interests include [[irony]], [[dialogue]], [[responsibility]], Feminist Theories of Agency, and Speech Act Theory.

two questions

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 04:57:06 GMT

• ''On moral priorities'': We are surrounded by demands on our moral attention. There is suffering that does or doesn't serve powerful interests, deception and disrespect, degradation of the biosphere. On top of these concerns, there are the myriad ways of improving our own character and resources. ''How can we find a [[middle path]] between passivity and exhaustion?''\n!• ''On engaging in moral discussion'': It is easy to indulge in moral criticism when we are surrounded by a sympathetic audience, or when we just want to sound off. Once differences surface, though, ''how do we maintain a [[dialogue]] that remains open to learning?''\n\nThese questions aren't simply academic, but they are difficult enough to motivate a philosophical search for decent answers.

G.H. Mead

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 04:52:54 GMT

[[George Herbert Mead|http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm]], a social psychologist, philosopher, and close friend of [[John Dewey]]'s, approached the development of self as the product of social interaction, and sought to cast moral problem-solving as a dynamic process which doesn't simply put constraints on a pre-moral self, but rather gives the self substance and significance. His [[interactionist model]] has been more influential within sociology and psychology than within philosophy, though his ideas are both philosophically and morally insightful.

moral provocation

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 04:36:15 GMT

"Moral provocation" is whatever moves us to engage in criticism. Such a phrase helps to indicate a certain open-textured experience: \n!If I say I "witnessed wrongdoing" or "learned of an action that seemed wrong", I probably settle quite quickly on a description of what it is that happened, and focus attention entirely on that event, described in that way. In hard cases, however, the sense that ''something'' is wrong is the starting point, and further specification of ''what was wrong'' emerges in a process of [[dialogue]], reflection, and cumulative perspective over time. \n!To be a wise moral critic (one with [[critical virtue]]) requires more than fixing attention on some X (say, abortion or military action) and deciding what attitude to have towards X, but to start from the sense of a morally [[problematic situation]], and to discern its ingredients along with the most constructive attitude to take towards them. The most constructive attitude to take may vary according to our different social positions, as well.

dialogue

Wed, 03 Aug 2005 04:32:27 GMT

Dialogue must occupy a central role in moral life if [[ideal foundations]] aren't out there waiting for us to tune them in. For that matter, dialogue is crucial even if there are ideals, as long as individual cannot be sure of //how// to tune in to them.\n!Dialogue is notoriously difficult, and most attempts to compose philosophical dialogues are thinly-veiled attempts to push one voice or the other. Surely [[critical virtue]] requires taking [[Responsibility]] not just for the content of what we say, but for how we embed it in [[dialogue]], with or without [[irony]].

Research Themes

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:23:00 GMT

... [[Responsibility]], [[Metaphors]], [[evil]], [[Representation]], [[critical virtue]]

Representation

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:23:00 GMT

Representation, according to pragmatists, is always situated and directed, and is meaningful only because of its uptake in interpretation and use. (One hears talk of pragmatist "anti-representationalism," but the word 'representation' is best recovered rather than discarded, I believe.)\n!\nWhile [[Charles Sanders Peirce]]'s approach to representation emphasizes how we work towards convergence in meanings and in habits of interpretative use, [[William James]] tends to emphasize divergence and individuality in the present. \n!\nOn my view, the tension between these points is not a simple disagreement; we have much to learn about the ''degree'' to which various concepts -- pragmatically understood -- can yield to ''social convergence'' pressures. There may not be one account of what makes things good to say (and hence true), but we may do fruitful investigation into the details that make some claims serve as broadly exchange-worthy propositions, while others remain only locally useful. \n!\nIn other words, all representations are more or less shared [[Social Affordances]] (see also [[Affordance Articles]]). So, in the context of moral cricticism, we should expect that only experience can teach how well a moral concept (like [[Responsibility]], [[evil]], or admirability) can serve as a stable reference-point in different interactions.\n!\nSee also [[Realism debates]]

evil

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:23:00 GMT

If moral philosophers approach 'evil' as a ''property'', we find ourselves soon entangled in awkward metaphysical debates and theoretical standoffs.\n!However, if we begin by asking about ''what stance'' is invoked by ''[[Representation]] of evil'', we may make further progress. Nietzsche is right at least that the representation of evil has both a history and a purpose, and that reality takes new shapes as our language evolves. This remains so even if Nietzsche's dismissal of suffering serves at best the functions of [[irony]] and provocation. \n!If representations of evil invoke a certain stance, there may well be ''cases in which it is good'' to take such a stance, and hence such representation may be reasonable in context. Even if a [[Principle of Charity]] figures into moral understanding, we cannot know a priori that [[critical virtue]] would //never// in practice involve representing something as evil. Critics and their audiences are limited beings with finite resources for [[Moral understanding]], and representations occur in all sorts of non-ideal situations.\n!Yet an emphasis on the ''practice'' of representing-as-evil makes it more doubtful that there is any being or event which ''everyone'' ought to represent-as-evil, across contexts.

Chapters

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:22:00 GMT

Chapters drafts toward the //Moral Theory and Constructive Criticism// manuscript include:\n* On [[critical virtue]]: a Neglected Virtue\n* [[Criticism as Speech Act]]: Accuracy and [[Performative Contradiction]]\n* [[Constructivist Accounts]] of Moral Phenomena\n* [[Representation]] of [[Responsibility]] and Representing Responsibly: Truth and [[Social Affordances]]\n* Concepts of [[evil]] under Pragmatic (de)construction\n* [[Critical Resistance]] and Moral Salience\n* [[Practical identity]], Contingent Commitments and Kantian Principles

irony

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:22:00 GMT

Although "irony" tends to suggest "sarcasm" and "insincerity" in popular use, philosophical irony is a much more subtle attitude. Whenever one speaks with attention to how multiple audiences would take one's words in entirely divergent directions, there is fertile ground for irony. If [[G.H. Mead]] is right that relatively consistent social uptake is necessary for us to understand "the meaning" of our own words (See [[vs. Meaning rationalism]]), then the ironist may be in a position not of "insincerity", but rather of not having avaliable any relevant utterance that one //could// "really mean", independent of audience and context.\n!Because [[critical virtue]] is most evident in its handling of hard cases, and because hard cases are characterized by broad differences of perspective, I believe the wise moral critic will often employ what amounts to irony. We find there to be no single "sincere meaning" to some crucial utterances by Socrates, by Confucius, and indeed by the [[feminist social critics|file:///Volumes/espringer/public_html/quotes.html#%5B%5Bfeminist%20social%20critics*%5D%5D]] discussed by Cheshire Calhoun and Ruth Bleier.

critical virtue

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:19:00 GMT

Aristotle describes virtues as states of character, developed through lifelong experience, which enable us to make wise practical choices. Each virtue represents an understanding of how to function well within a key domain of human experience. Generally, on his account, a virtue requires attunement to the [[middle path]] between vices, where at least one extreme state is tempting, and another represents an overcompensation or inflexible attempt at moral excellence. \n!Still, Aristotle tends to write of the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of ordinary character traits without direct attention to the activities of praise and blame or to the character of one who approaches these well. If our moral characters are largely shaped by social intervention and evaluative cues, then these activities are themselves something we learn to do more or less well. This sort of virtue, along with its implications for moral theory, is the subject of my [[Research Project]].

middle path

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:19:00 GMT

On [[Aristotle's account]], each virtue involves learning the appropriate mean between undesirable extremes (vices). The brave person, for example, keeps safely away from the temptations of cowardice, without straying into rashness. Such a model works better for some virtues than for others, but it does seem to fit well with the nature of critical virtue:\n!\nOn an ordinary practical level, the activity of moral criticism frequently leads to resistance, polarization and antagonism. Among those opposed to the vice of [[Judgmentalism]], one common response is to insist upon "[[Judging Not]]", yet this is also plausibly treated as a vice at the other extreme. Thus [[critical virtue]] requires honing a critical attitude (towards self as well as towards others) that remains constructive.

Precarious

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:19:00 GMT

"The precarious", as it plays with and against "the stable", is the dynamic term in [[John Dewey]]'s controversial -- //precariously received//-- metaphysics. Whether something is precarious is, of course, a matter ''relative'' to the timeframe and interests we bring to the matter. A practice's ability to function well may be precarious in ways that are not transparent to even those who are fluent with it. The skills of [[critical virtue]] are precariously dependent on personal, cultural, and historical variables. \n![[Martha Nussbaum]] embeds a similar point in her title phrase, //The Fragility of Goodness// -- though goodness is in some cases remarkably ''resilient'' as well.

Dissertation

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 22:17:00 GMT

''“Critical Virtue: Evaluative Moves and the Emergence of Moral Agency” ''\n(defended April 2000 at University of Connecticut, with Joel J. Kupperman, major advisor)\n<<<\n''Abstract:'' Moral agents spend as much of their attention responding critically to others’ choices as deliberating about their own. How is this activity related to moral agency? Most consequentialist and deontological theories lend themselves to legalistic, verdict-oriented scrutiny of actions around us, but they speak little to how such judgments should influence a critic's own choices. I argue that intervention in one another’s habits is central to moral life, but that our attitudes toward particular events are and must be more subtle than ‘approval’ and ‘disapproval’. An undercurrent of “thick” evaluative attitudes and reactions, developed without conscious moral premises, shapes our moral personality. Cognitive assessments of what should provoke us morally cannot simply override these. \n!\nCrucially, we can and do reshape each other’s evaluative reactions, however; and our ability to do so is a hallmark of moral interaction. I provide a naturalistic account of how moral complexity develops out of simpler practical competences. It suggests that the workings of praise, blame, and sanctions, for example, are fragile and context-sensitive, and must be fine-tuned and re-evaluated as social and cultural contexts evolve. Entrenched moral conflict, I argue, is generally not to be traced to inconsistent moral premises, but rather to histories of blunt or misdirected responses and interventions, and the moral resistance engendered all around by such dynamics. Critical inquiry into how we engage with others’ apparent moral blunders functions as a powerful engine of moral improvement, even in the absence of any other systematic moral theory.\n<<<

reading...

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 21:54:00 GMT

Claudia Card, "Responsibility Ethics, Shared Understandings and Moral Communities" (//Hypatia//, 2002)\n!Nancy Nyquist Potter, //How Can I Be Trusted?// (2002)\n\nComments on items [[recently read...]]

External Links

Mon, 01 Aug 2005 20:27:00 GMT

[[Episteme Links|http://www.epistemelinks.com]] (general philosophy resource online)\n[[Reasoning Well|http://parmenides.objectis.net/reason]] (informal reasoning web of terms)\n[[Ethics Updates|http://ethics.acusd.edu/]] (a broad and deep source of online ethics materials)\n[[Ten Waysto Make a Difference|http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1998----02.htm]] (a list excerpted from Peter Singer's book)\n![[TiddlyWiki's original site|www.tiddlywiki.com/]] (by Jeremy Ruston) \n[[QwikiWeb adaptation|http://snipurl.com/qwikiweb/]] (by Alan Hecht)

Affordance Articles

Wed, 27 Jul 2005 01:13:00 GMT

The discussion within ''ecological psychology'' of //affordances// interests me for two reasons: \n# Gibson's claims about the contents of perception are close analogues to pragmatist claims about the contents of cognition. Given a [[Pragmatist account]] of [[Responsibility]], I suspect that it may in some cases be perceived "directly" in Gibson's sense (that is, not only inferred from "neutral" data).\n# The Gibsonians who do social psychology might be grappling more openly with the tension between action that's immediately possible for an agent and action that the agent could recognize to be possible in an "at large" sense. Should different people have different perceptions of responsibility (because they have different ''situated abilities'' to engage and call forth others' responsiveness), or should the medium of language force representations to converge?\n!''Andrea Scarantino, "Affordances Explained"'' (//Philosophy of Science//, 2003)\n!!This piece offers a concise explanation of affordances, with a focus on making affordances palatable even for those who reject some of Gibson's anti-inferentialism. Scarantino makes several distinctions sound firmer than they are in practice, but nothing would be lost by casting them as matters of degree. \n!''Aaron Ben Zeev, "The Kantian Revolution in Perception"'' (//Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior//, 1984)\n!!This piece outlines the Kantian flavor of the Gibsonian move of allowing significance to be ''already present'' in perception rather than imposed between sensation and judgment, and goes on to question whether Gibson requires the equivalent of Kantian "schemata".\n!''G.P. Ginsburg, "The Ecological Perception Debate"'' (//Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior//, 1990)\n!!A nice overview of what's at stake in the intersection between ecological psychology and philosophical accounts of perception.\n!''Harry Heft, "Affordances, Dynamic Experience, and the Challenge of Reification"'' (//Ecological Psychology//, 2002)\n!!Highlights for me the optimistic view towards a synthesis of pragmatist moral theory and ecological psychology, by way of [[canonical affordances|quotes.html#%5B%5Bcanonical%20affordances*%5D%5D]]\n!''Darren Newtson, "Alternatives to Representation or Alternative Representations: Comments on te Ecological Approach"'' (//Contemporary Social Psychology// 1990)\n!!Newtson pushes Lewin's radical approach to social phenomena as dynamical systems, [[rejecting representation|quotes.html#%5B%5Brejecting%20representation*%5D%5D]] (in the sense of topological "mappings" of the environment).\n!''William G. Noble, "Gibsonian Theory and the Pragmatist Perspective"'' (//J Theory Social Behaviour//, 1981)\n!!Attends to difficulties with [[Gibson, language, and norms*|quotes.html#%5B%5BGibson%2C%20language%2C%20and%20norms*%5D%5D]], calling for more of Mead's insights, which seems right to me. \n

Responsibility

Mon, 25 Jul 2005 19:28:00 GMT

'Responsibility' is ripe for pragmatic treatment, as attempts to capture it as a property have led into difficult metaphysical thickets. [[Margaret Urban Walker|http://www.asu.edu/clas/justice/faculty/profiles/margaret_walker/margaret_walker.htm]] draws attention to what she calls "practices of responsibility", and this is an improvement over talk of responsibility as a static property. If responsibility is not simply "discovered", assessed, and disclosed via language, but shaped and ''cultivated'', then we need to attend more to the ''conditions'' under which our talk of responsibility fosters and supports its development.\n!My emerging view might be called an ''ecological'' or ''dynamic'' view of responsibility. Among [[Social Affordances]], responsibility has a complex structure: for it implies both that the agent in question is to be apporached as liable, answerable, and accountable for existing problems (a dimension of dissatisfaction and subordination of the agent to various concerns), and that the agent is potentially to-be-trusted and can be expected to recognize and act on behalf of shared goods (a dimension of satisfaction and recognition of agency).\n!From this angle, the "[[Precarious]]ness" of our concepts of responsibility suggests ''not a metaphysical problems'' about causality or freedom, but a practical attention to the complexity of moral attitudes. What makes attributions of responsibility appropriate is not any property internal to the agent in question, though it is a ''real'' feature of dynamic relations among agents. \n!See also [[Responsibility Articles]] and [[Moral Realism Articles]]